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1 Introduction
Consider an abstract device Σ(G) that can store a single element x from a fixed, publicly known finite
abelian group G. An adversary cannot obtain any information on the value stored in Σ(G), but he can
manipulate the stored data by adding some value δ ∈ G of his choice. As a result, Σ(G) stores the value
x + δ. This value depends only on the adversary’s a priori knowledge of x. Such a tampering is called
an algebraic manipulation.
One-time-pad encryption is an example of such a device. It hides the message perfectly but an adversary
can add any string to it without being detected. Linear secret sharing provides another example. The
reader is referred to [1] for a recent survey on secret sharing. In a linear secret sharing scheme, a secret
value is distributed into shares among a set of participants. Only some qualified subsets of participants
can recover the secret value form their shares. Both the secret and the shares are vectors over some finite
field, and the secret is reconstructed by computing a linear map on the shares of a qualified set. A coalition
of dishonest players may have no information about the secret value, but they can manipulate the output
of the reconstruction process by providing forged shares. Because of the homomorphic properties of such
schemes, they can control the difference between the shared secret s and the incorrect reconstructed
value s′.
An algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code encodes a source s into a value x ∈ G stored in Σ(G) in
such a way that any algebraic manipulation is detected with high probability, even if the adversary knows
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the value of s. In contrast to standard message authentication codes, there is no secret key involved.
Algebraic manipulation detection codes were introduced in [5] as an abstraction of several previously
presented methods for cheating detection in linear secret sharing schemes [4, 15–18, 22]. Following the
ideas of [7], [5] also showed the usefulness of AMD codes to the design of robust fuzzy extractors.
Several other applications of AMD codes were found subsequently. For instance, to unconditionally
secure multiparty computation with dishonest majority [3], anonymous quantum communication [2], non-
malleable codes [9], codes for computationally simple channels [11], and public key encryption against
related key attacks [24].
This paper contains a detailed presentation of the known results about AMD codes, and also some
new results: the bound in Theorem 5.4, and the construction strategies in Subsections 7.2 and 7.3.
2 Definitions and lower bounds
Definition 2.1. Let S be a set of size m > 1 and G a commutative group of order n. Consider
a pair (E,D) formed by a probabilistic encoding map E : S → G and a deterministic decoding map
D : G → S ∪ {⊥} such that D(E(s)) = s with probability 1 for every s ∈ S.
• The pair (E,D) is an (m,n, ε)-algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code if for every s ∈ S and
for every δ ∈ G, the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} is at most ε.
• The pair (E,D) is a weak (m,n, ε)-algebraic manipulation detection code if for every δ ∈ G and for
s sampled uniformly at random from S (independent of δ), the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} is
at most ε.
Trivially, since the bound ε on the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} holds for every fixed choice
of δ ∈ G, it also holds for δ chosen in a randomized way, as long as it is chosen independently of the
randomness of the probabilistic encoding map E, and of the uniform choice of s in the case of a weak
AMD code.
The following bounds on the size of codewords in AMD codes were proved by Ogata and Kurosawa [16]
in the framework of cheating detection in secret sharing.
Theorem 2.2. In every (m,n, ε)-AMD code, respectively weak (m,n, ε)-AMD code,
n  m− 1
ε2
+ 1 , respectively n  m− 1
ε
+ 1 .
Proof. For every s ∈ S, consider
ρ(s) =
|⋃s′ =sD−1(s′)|
n− 1 =
∑
s′ =s |D−1(s′)|
n− 1 ,
where D−1(s′) naturally denotes the set of all g ∈ G with D(g) = s′. First note that for arbitrary but
fixed s ∈ S and E(s) ∈ G, and for δ ∈ G \ {0} chosen uniformly at random, E(s) + δ is uniformly
distributed over G \ {E(s)}, and thus the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} is ρ(s).
The bound for weak AMD codes now follows from observing that |D−1(s′)|  1 for every s′ ∈ S and
thus ρ(s)  (m− 1)/(n− 1), and from noting that if this bound (m− 1)/(n− 1) on the probability that
D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} holds for every fixed choice of s and E(s), it also hold for randomized choices, so
that ε  (m− 1)/(n− 1).
The bound for ordinary (i.e., non-weak) AMD codes follows from observing that here |D−1(s′)|  1/ε
for every s′ ∈ S, as can easily be seen, and from noting similarly to above that the resulting bound on
the probability that D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥} also holds for a randomized choice of E(s).
The tag length logn− logm of an (m,n, ε)-AMD code measures the number of redundant bits that are
needed to encode the source. A natural optimization problem is to minimize the tag length for any given
values of the source length logm and the adversary’s success probability ε. More specifically, minimizing
the tag length for families of AMD codes encoding arbitrarily long messages for a fixed value of ε.
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3 Weak algebraic manipulation detection codes
In this section, we present the known constructions of weak AMD codes. All of them are deterministic,
that is, the encoding map E : S → G is deterministic. Then, the decoding map D : G → S ∪ {⊥} is
determined by D(E(s)) = s and D(g) = ⊥ if g /∈ E(S). Deterministic weak AMD codes have been
implicitly used in [4,16,18] to construct secret sharing schemes with cheating detection. In addition, the
robust codes introduced by Karpovsky and Taubin [13] are equivalent to a special class of deterministic
weak AMD codes (as specified later).
Deterministic weak AMD codes are closely related to difference sets, specifically to a slightly more
general object that is introduced here. Recall that in an (n,m, t)-difference set, every nonzero element
of G appears exactly t times in the list of differences.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a group of finite order n. A subset V ⊆ G of size m is an (n,m, t)-bounded
difference set if the list of differences (v −w)v,w∈V , contains every nonzero element of G at most t times.
We prove in the following that there is an equivalence between bounded difference sets and deterministic
weak AMD codes.
Theorem 3.2. An injective map E : S → G determines a deterministic weak (m,n, ε)-AMD code if
and only if E(S) ⊆ G is an (n,m, t)-bounded difference set with t  εm.
Proof. Consider V = E(S) and let t be the maximum number of times that a nonzero element δ ∈ G
occurs in the list of differences (v − w)v,w∈V . Clearly, if s is sampled uniformly at random from S, then
maxδ∈G Pr(D(E(s) + δ) /∈ {s,⊥}) = t/m.
Example 3.3. Consider G = Z7 and V = {0, 1, 3} ⊆ G. Clearly V ⊆ G is a (7, 3, 1)-difference set.
Therefore, if |S| = 3, any injective map E : S → G with E(S) = V determines a weak (3, 7, 1/3)-AMD
code. This weak AMD code is optimal because n = 1 + (m− 1)/ε, that is, the bound in Theorem 2.2 is
attained.
Example 3.4. More generally, for ever prime power q, there exists an (n,m, 1)-difference set in G = Zn
with n = q2 + q + 1 and m = q + 1. Each one of these difference sets provides a weak (m,n, 1/m)-AMD
code attaining the bound in Theorem 2.2. This fact was used by Ogata and Kurosawa [16] to present a
family of optimal secret sharing schemes with cheating detection.
Example 3.5. Let Fq be a finite field with characteristic different from 2 and G = F2q. Then V =
{(x, x2) ∈ G : x ∈ Fq} is a (q2, q, 1)-bounded difference set. This implies the existence of a weak
(q, q2, 1/q)-AMD code for every odd prime power q. They were used in [18], also for cheating detection
in secret sharing.
In the weak AMD codes in the previous examples, ε = 1/|S|. A more flexible family of weakly secure
AMD codes is obtained from the bounded difference sets in the following proposition, which generalizes
the ones in Example 3.5.
Proposition 3.6. Let q be a prime and consider integers 1  r  k and a surjective Fq-linear map
φ : Fqk → Fqr . If q is odd, then
V = {(x, φ(x2)) : x ∈ Fqk} ⊆ Fqk × Fqr
is a (qk+r , qk, qk−r)-bounded difference set. If q = 2, then
V = {(x, φ(x3)) : x ∈ F2k} ⊆ F2k × F2r
is a (2k+r, 2k, 2k−r+1)-bounded difference set.
Proof. We have to check how many times a nonzero element (δ1, δ2) ∈ Fqk × Fqr appears in the list of
differences of pairs of elements in V . If q is odd, (x, φ(x2))+(δ1, δ2) ∈ V if and only if φ(2xδ1+δ21) = δ2. If
δ1 = 0, then this condition is only satisfied if δ2 = 0. If δ1 = 0, this is equivalent to 2xδ1 + δ21 ∈ φ−1(δ2).
Since |φ−1(δ2)| = qk−r, there are exactly qk−r elements x ∈ Fqk in this situation. If q = 2, then
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(x, φ(x3)) + (δ1, δ2) ∈ V if and only if φ(3x2δ1 + 3xδ21 + δ31) = δ2. For every y ∈ φ−1(δ2), there are at
most two elements x ∈ F2k such that 3x2δ1 + 3xδ21 + δ31 = y.
The weak (qk, qk+r, 1/qr)-AMD codes that are determined by these bounded difference sets when q is
odd were implicitly used in [4] to construct almost optimal secret sharing schemes with cheater detection.
The construction for q = 2 provides weak (2k, 2k+r, 1/2r−1)-AMD codes. Observe that arbitrarily long
messages can be encoded for fixed values of ε. These deterministic weak AMD codes are systematic, that
is, S is a group and the encoding map is of the form E : S → S × G′ with E(s) = (s, f(s)) for some
group G′ and some deterministic map f : S → G′. The bound in Theorem 2.2 cannot be attained by any
systematic weak AMD code because ε  1/|G′| = n/m. Therefore, the above AMD codes for odd q are
optimal in that they attain this bound for weak systematic AMD codes. Systematic weak AMD codes
are equivalent to the robust codes introduced in [13]. In fact, the constructions of robust codes presented
in [13] are also based on the bounded difference sets described in Proposition 3.6.
4 Algebraic manipulation detection codes and differential structures
We present in this section a characterization of AMD codes in terms of differential structures, a combi-
natorial object that was introduced in [5].
For a group G of order n and a set S of size m, let (Vs)s∈S be a family of disjoint non-empty subsets
of G. We call (G, (Vs)s∈S) a differential structure. The parameters of interest related to a differential
structure are as follows. For any s ∈ S, we write ts for the maximal overlap between any translation of
Vs and the union of the other sets. Namely,
ts = max
δ∈G
∣∣∣(Vs + δ) ∩ ⋃
s′ =s
Vs′
∣∣∣.
Differential structures are closely related to AMD codes. An AMD code (E,D) is said to be with
uniform selection if the encoding E(s) is uniformly distributed over D−1(s) = {g ∈ G : D(g) = s} for
every s ∈ S. Only AMD codes with uniform selection appear in the natural constructions we are aware
of.
Let (E,D) be an (m,n, ε)-AMD code with uniform selection with E : S → G and take Vs = D−1(s)
for every s ∈ S. Then (G, (Vs)s∈S) is a differential structure with ts  ε |Vs| for every s ∈ S. Conversely,
given a differential structure (G, (Vs)s∈S), consider E : S → G in which E(s) is taken uniformly at random
from Vs and D : G → S is given by D(g) = s if g ∈ Vs and D(g) = ⊥ if g /∈
⋃
s∈S Vs. Then (E,D) is an
(m,n, ε)-AMD code with uniform selection, where m = |S|, n = |G| and ε = maxs∈S ts/|Vs|.
Example 4.1. Consider a finite field Fq and, for every s ∈ S, the vector vs = (0, 1, s) ∈ F3q and the
line Vs = {(s, 0, 0) + λvs : λ ∈ Fq} ⊆ F3q. Then (F3q, (Vs)s∈Fq ) is a differential structure with ts = 1 for
every s ∈ Fq. Indeed, for every δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3) ∈ F3q,
Vs + δ = {(s, 0, 0) + δ + λvs : λ ∈ Fq}
is a line in F3q that lies on the plane x = s + δ1. Therefore, (Vs + δ) ∩ Vs′ = ∅ if s′ = s + δ1 and
|(Vs + δ) ∩ Vs+δ1 | = 1 if δ1 = 0 because the vectors vs and vs+δ1 are linearly independent. A (q, q3, 1/q)-
AMD code is obtained from this differential structure.
Another differential structure that may be useful for the construction of AMD codes is obtained from
caps in projective spaces. A cap is a set of points in a projective space over a finite field such that no
three of them are collinear. A survey on this topic can be found in [12, Section 4]. Equivalently, a cap
is a set of nonzero vectors in a vector space over a finite field such that no three of them are linearly
dependent.
Let S ⊆ Frq be a cap and, for every s ∈ S, consider
Vs = {λs : λ ∈ Fq \ {0}} ⊆ Frq.
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Then (Frq, (Vs)s∈S) is a differential structure with ts = 1 for every s ∈ S. Indeed, if there exists δ ∈ Frq
such that ∣∣∣(Vs + δ) ∩ ⋃
s′ =s
Vs′
∣∣∣ > 1,
then λs+ δ = λ1s1 and λ
′s+ δ = λ2s2, for some λ, λ′, λ1, λ2 ∈ Fq \ {0} with λ = λ′ and s1, s2 ∈ S \ {s}.
Therefore, (λ − λ′)s = λ1s1 − λ2s2. If s1 = s2, the set {s, s1} is linearly dependent, otherwise the set
{s, s1, s2} is linearly dependent, a contradiction in both cases.
5 Systematic algebraic manipulation detection codes
An AMD code is systematic if the source set S is a group and the encoding is of the form
E : S → G = S × G1 × G2, s 
→ (s, x, f(x, s))
for some function f : G1×S → G2, where G1 and G2 are groups and x is taken uniformly at random from
G1. The decoding function of a systematic AMD code is naturally given by
D(s, x, e) =
{
s, if e = f(x, s),
⊥, otherwise.
Clearly, a systematic AMD code is with uniform selection. The underlying differential structure is given
by the sets Vs = {(s, x, f(x, s)) : x ∈ G1}. In such differential structures,
ts = max
δ∈G
s′ =s
|(Vs + δ) ∩ Vs′ | = max
(δ1,δ2)∈G1×G2
s′ =s
|{x ∈ G1 : f(x, s) + δ2 = f(x+ δ1, s′)}|. (5.1)
For systematic AMD codes, we notate n1 = |G1| and n2 = |G2|. That is, in a systematic (m,n, ε)-AMD
code, n = mn1n2. We give first a quite obvious bound on the values of n1, n2 that excludes the possibility
that the bound in Theorem 2.2 is attained by a systematic AMD code. The intuition behind this result
is derived from the fact that an adversary can always try to guess the value of x ∈ G1 or the value of the
difference δ2 = f(x, s
′)− f(x, s) ∈ G2.
Proposition 5.1. In every systematic AMD code, ni  1/ε for i = 1, 2. As a consequence, n  m/ε2.
Proof. Let (G, (Vs)s∈S) be the underlying differential structure. Since |Vs| = n1 for every s ∈ S, it is
clear that ε  1/n1. Given s, s′ ∈ S with s = s′ and δ1 ∈ G1, consider the mapping φ : G1 → G2 defined
by φ(x) = f(x+ δ1, s
′)− f(x, s). Since |φ−1(δ2)|  n1/n2 for some δ2 ∈ G2, we have that ts  n1/n2 by
Equation (5.1), and hence ε  ts/|Vs|  1/n2.
Example 5.2. A systematic (q, q3, 1/q)-AMD code is obtained by taking S = G1 = G2 = Fq and
f : G1 × S → G2 with f(x, s) = xs. This AMD code is equivalent to the one that is obtained from the
differential structure in Example 4.1.
Example 5.3. Consider S = Fq and G1 = G2 = Frq. The function f : G1 × S → G2 defined by
f((x1, . . . , xr), s) = (sx1, . . . , sxr) determines a systematic (q, q
2r+1, 1/qr)-AMD code.
The AMD codes in the two previous examples were implicitly used in [4] in the framework of cheater
detection in secret sharing. They satisfy logn− logm = −2 log ε, and hence their tag length is optimal
because the bound in Proposition 5.1 is attained. Nevertheless, ε  1/m is too small for the applications,
in which we need to encode arbitrarily long source messages with a fixed adversary’s success probability.
By the bound we present in Theorem 5.4, it is not possible to attain the bound in Proposition 5.1
when m is much larger than 1/ε. This result is an adaptation of [23, Theorem 3.1], which corresponds
to a different definition of AMD codes (see Subsection 7.4).
Theorem 5.4. In every systematic (m,mn1n2, ε)-AMD code with ε < 1,
ε  logm
n1 logn2
.
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Proof. Given a systematic (m,mn1n2, ε)-AMD code with ε < 1 defined by a function f : G1×S → G2,
consider, for every pair (δ2, s) ∈ G2 × S, the function Gδ2,s : G1 → G2 defined by Gδ2,s(x) = f(x, s) + δ2.
We affirm that all these functions are different. Indeed, suppose that Gδ2,s = Gδ′2,s′ , that is, f(x, s)+δ2 =
f(x, s′) + δ′2 for every x ∈ G1. Obviously, δ2 = δ′2 if s = s′ and, by (5.1), ts = n1 if s = s′, a contradiction
with ε < 1. Therefore,
C = {(Gδ2,s(x))x∈G1 : (δ2, s) ∈ G2 × S} ⊆ Gn12
is a code with mn2 codewords of length n1 over an alphabet of size n2. The Hamming distance between
the codewords corresponding to Gδ2,s and Gδ′2,s′ is obviously equal to n1 if s = s
′ and δ2 = δ′2, and it
is at least n1 − ts if s = s′. Therefore, ε  (n1 − d)/n1 if d is the minimum distance of C. Finally,
mn2  nn1−d+12 by the Singleton bound.
As a consequence of Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.4, a lower bound on the tag length of systematic
AMD codes is obtained, and also an impossibility result.
Corollary 5.5. In every systematic (m,mn1n2, ε)-AMD code with ε < 1,
logn1 + logn2  −2 log ε+ log logm− log logn2.
Proof. Take into account that logn1  − log ε+log logm− log logn2 by Theorem 5.4 and that logn2 
− log ε by Proposition 5.1.
Corollary 5.6. There is no systematic (m,mn1n2, ε)-AMD code with ε < 1 if logm  n1 logn2.
6 An almost optimal flexible construction
The following construction of a systematic AMD code makes it possible to encode arbitrarily long source
messages for fixed values of ε. In addition, the bound in Theorem 5.4 is almost attained. This AMD
code construction first appeared in an early draft of [5]. Concurrently and independently, the same
construction was used as a tool in the context of robust fuzzy extractors in [7], though without making
its abstract properties explicit.
For a finite field Fq with characteristic p and a positive integer r such that r + 2 is not divisible by p,
consider S = Frq and G1 = G2 = Fq. We prove next that the function
f(x, s) = f(x, (s1, . . . , sr)) = x
r+2 +
r∑
i=1
six
i (6.1)
determines a systematic (qr, qr+2, (r + 1)/q)-AMD code. By (5.1), it is enough to prove that, for every
s, s′ ∈ Frq with s = s′ and for every δ1, δ2 ∈ Fq, there exist at most r + 1 values x ∈ Fq such that
f(x, s) + δ2 = f(x+ δ1, s
′). Observe that
f(x+ δ1, s
′) = xr+2 + (r + 2)δ1xr+1 +
r∑
i=1
s′ix
i + δ1h(x),
where h is a polynomial of degree at most r. Therefore,
f(x+ δ1, s
′)− (f(x, s) + δ2) = (r + 2)δ1xr+1 +
r∑
i=1
(s′i − si)xi + δ1h(x)− δ2. (6.2)
The left side of Equation (6.2) is a nonzero polynomial on x of degree at most r + 1. Indeed, this is
obvious if δ1 = 0 and, if δ1 = 0, the left side simplifies to
∑r
i=1(s
′
i − si)xi − δ2, which is nonzero because
s = s′. Therefore, this polynomial has at most r + 1 roots and the proof is concluded.
The tag length of these AMD codes is logn1+logn2 = 2 log q = −2 log ε+2 log(r+1), which is almost
optimal according to Theorem 5.4. Moreover, this family is flexible in the sense that, given m0 and ε0,
and a prime p, we can find an (m,n, ε)-AMD in that family with m = pkr  m0 and ε = (r+1)/pk  ε0
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such that the tag length logm− logn is close to −2 log ε0. Indeed, this is achieved by taking r equal to
the smallest positive integer such that r + 2 is not divisible by p and logm0  r(log(r + 1)− log ε0) and
taking
k =
⌈
log(r + 1)− log ε0
log p
⌉
.
Therefore,
logn− logm = 2k log p  −2 log ε0 + 2 log(r + 1) + 2 log p
 −2 log ε0 + 2 log
(
− logm0
log ε0
+ 3
)
+ 2 log p,
because (k − 1) log p  log(r − 1)− log ε0 and (r − 2)(log(r − 1)− log ε0)  logm0.
7 Other constructions
We discuss here some strategies to find alternatives to the construction of AMD codes in Section 6.
7.1 From authentication codes
The first one, which was proposed in [5], consists of combining weak AMD codes and authentication
codes [19–21]. Consider a systematic authentication code A : S ×K → T such that S and T are groups.
Such codes are used to authenticate a message s ∈ S by adding to it the tag σ = A(k, s), where k
is taken uniformly at random from K and is known by the sender and the receiver. Let pS be the
success probability of the substitution attack, that is, the maximum over all s = s′ of the probability of
successfully substituting the authenticated s by s′. We consider as well a systematic weak (m, |K|, ε1)-
AMD code whose encoding map is of the form E′ : K → K × G3 with E′(k) = (k, g(k)) for some
group G3. Finally, take G1 = K and G2 = G3 × T . Then the map E : S → S × G1 × G2 defined by
E(s) = (s, k, (g(k), A(k, s)), where k is chosen uniformly at random from K, determines a systematic
(m,mn1n2, ε)-AMD code with ε = max{ε1, pS}. We proceed now to estimate the tag length of these
systematic AMD codes. Clearly, pS  1/|T | and, by [21, Theorem 5.2], |K|  |T |2 if pS = 1/|T |. In
addition, ε  1/|G3|. Therefore, the tag length of such an AMD code is around −4 log ε.
In order to construct AMD codes with similar properties as the ones in Section 6, we should use
authentication codes such that S is much larger that K and T . A well-known family of such authentication
codes is obtained by taking S = Frq, K = F2q and T = Fq together with
A[(s1, . . . , sr), (x, b)] = b+
r∑
i=1
six
i.
The substitution probability is pS = r/q. By identifying F
2
q with Fq2 , a systematic weak (q
2, q3, ε1)-AMD
code E′ : K → K× Fq with ε1 = 1/q if q is odd and ε1 = 2/q if q is even can be found in the family that
is derived from Proposition 3.6. In conclusion, a systematic AMD code with m = qr, n1 = n2 = q
2 and
ε = r/q is obtained. Clearly, this construction can not compete with the one in Section 6.
7.2 From error correcting codes
The bound for systematic AMD codes in Theorem 5.4 is proved from properties of error correcting codes
that are derived from AMD codes. This connection also works in the other direction, that is, error
correcting codes can be used to construct systematic AMD codes. This idea has been used by Karpovsky
and Wang [14, 23], who introduced constructions of AMD codes from generalized Reed-Muller codes.
Nevertheless, their constructions are difficult to analyze here because they consider a different definition
of AMD code (see Subsection 7.4) and different optimization problems.
Consider groups S, G1 and G2, a code C ⊆ GG12 , and a surjective encoding map c : S → C. The
codewords in C are of the form c(s) = (cx(s))x∈G1 , where cx(s) ∈ G2. A systematic AMD code is
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obtained by considering the function f : G1 × S → G2 with f(x, s) = cx(s). In fact, this description
applies to every systematic AMD code.
We next analyze the systematic AMD codes in Section 6 under this point of view. Clearly, those AMD
codes are obtained from Reed-Solomon codes that have been modified in some way. Observe that the
systematic AMD code associated with the Reed-Solomon code
C = {(h(x))x∈Fq : h ∈ Fq[X ], deg h  r}
has ε = 1 because C contains constant codewords. We can remove them by considering the code
C′ = {(h(x))x∈Fq : h ∈ Fq[X ], h is monic, deg h = r, h(0) = 0},
but the corresponding AMD code has ε = 1 as well. Indeed, given h = Xr+
∑r
i=1 hiX
i and δ1 ∈ Fq, then
h(X + δ1) = X
r +
∑r
i=1 ĥiX
i + b0 = ĥ+ b0. This implies that Vs + δ = V
′
s for some δ ∈ G and s, s′ ∈ S
with s = s′. This problem appears because the Reed-Solomon code C is invariant under permutations
x 
→ x+ δ1 of the indices. In particular, it is a cyclic code if q is prime. In order to avoid this problem,
we can take the code
C′′ = {(h(x))x∈Fq : h ∈ Fq[X ], h is monic, deg h = r, h(0) = 0, hr−1 = 0},
which determines an AMD code in the family described in Section 6. Because of the requirement hr−1 = 0,
for every h ∈ Fq[X ], at most one codeword in the orbit {(h(x+ δ1))x∈Fq : δ1 ∈ Fq} ⊆ C is in C′′.
A more general construction of systematic AMD codes is suggested by the previous discussion. Let
C ⊆ GG21 be a code such that, for every c ∈ C, the orbit Cc = {(cx+δ1)x∈G1 : δ1 ∈ G1} is contained in C.
Observe that, if G1 is a cyclic group, this property is equivalent to C being a cyclic code. We introduce
a special distance in C. Namely, for every two words c, c′ ∈ C, consider Δ(c, c′) = minδ2∈G2 d(c +
(δ2, . . . , δ2), c
′), where d is the Hamming distance. We consider as well the distance between orbits
Δ(Cc, Cc′ ) defined in the obvious way. Finally, consider C
′ ⊆ C such that |C′ ∩ Cc|  1 for every c ∈ C
and take Δ(C′) = min{Δ(Cc, Cc′) : c, c′ ∈ C′, Cc = Cc′}. Then it is clear that a systematic AMD
code with m = |C′|, ni = |Gi| for i = 1, 2, and ε = (n1 − Δ(C′))/n1 is obtained from C′. Intuitively,
constructions of optimal or almost optimal systematic AMD codes should be obtained from suitable
families of linear cyclic codes.
7.3 From caps in projective spaces
The bound in Theorem 5.4 applies only to systematic AMD codes. Therefore, the existence of non-
systematic AMD codes with optimal tag length logn − logm = −2 log ε when ε is fixed and m is
arbitrarily large is still an open problem.
A possible strategy to find such AMD codes is to find suitable differential structures. We analyze
here the possibilities of the differential structures from caps in projective spaces that are described in
Section 4. From the discussion there, a cap S ⊆ Frq with |S| = m determines an (m, qr, 1/(q − 1))-AMD
code. For our problem, we need to find large caps in Frq for a fixed q and arbitrarily large values of r.
Let m(r, q) be the maximum size of a cap in Frq. The best upper and lower bounds on m(r, q) that were
known in 2001 are surveyed in [12, Section 4]. For instance, m(r, q)  qr−2− qr−3+8qr−4+15qr−5+1 if
r  6, and q > 7 and q odd [12, Table 4.4(i)]. A similar upper bound is given for q even in the same table.
These upper bounds do not exclude the existence of AMD codes with optimal tag length. Nevertheless,
it is not known if these upper bounds are attained, and the known lower bounds [12, Table 4.6(iii)] do
not solve our problem.
7.4 Stronger algebraic manipulation detection codes
An alternative definition of AMD code, with a stronger requirement, was proposed in [14, 23]. Namely,
it is required that, for every s ∈ S and for every δ ∈ G \ {0}, the probability that D(E(s) + δ) = ⊥
is at most ε. That is, every undetected algebraic manipulation of the encoding E(s) is considered an
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adversarial success, even if the source message s is not altered. These stronger AMD codes are useful
in the construction of non-malleable secret sharing schemes [10, Definition 1], and other applications are
mentioned in [14].
Observe that the AMD code in Example 5.2 does not satisfy that stronger requirement. Indeed,
the algebraic manipulation E(s) + δ = (s, x, xs) + (0, δ1, sδ1) is not detected with probability 1. The
same applies to the (m, qr, 1/(q − 1))-AMD codes that are obtained from caps in projective spaces (see
Subsection 7.3), because the algebraic manipulation E(s)+δ = λs+μs is detected if and only if λ+μ = 0.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to check that the AMD codes described in Section 6 satisfy the
stronger requirement for the same value of ε. Other constructions of stronger AMD codes are given
in [14, 23].
Acknowledgements The third author’s work was supported by the Singapore National Research Foundation
(Grant No. NRF-CRP2-2007-03).
References
1 Beimel A. Secret-sharing schemes: A survey on coding and cryptology. In: Third International Workshop, IWCC
2011, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6639. Berlin: Springer, 2011, 11–46
2 Brassard G, Broadbent A, Fitzsimons J, et al. Anonymous quantum communication. In: Advances in Cryptology,
Asiacrypt 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4833. Berlin: Springer, 2007, 460–473
3 Broadbent A, Tapp A. Information-theoretic security without an honest majority. In: Advances in Cryptology, Asi-
acrypt 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4833. Berlin: Springer, 2007, 410–426
4 Cabello S, Padro´ C, Sa´ez G. Secret sharing schemes with detection of cheaters for a general access structure. Des
Codes Cryptogr, 2002, 25: 175–188
5 Cramer R, Dodis Y, Fehr S, et al. Detection of algebraic manipulation with applications to robust secret sharing and
fuzzy extractors. In: Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt 2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4965. Berlin:
Springer, 2008, 471–488
6 Dodis Y, Kanukurthi B, Katz J, et al. Robust fuzzy extractors and authenticated key agreement from close secrets.
IEEE Trans Inform Theory, 2012, 58: 6207–6222
7 Dodis Y, Katz J, Reyzin L, et al. Robust fuzzy extractors and authenticated key agreement from close secrets. In:
Advances in Cryptology, Crypto 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4117. Berlin: Springer, 2006, 232–250
8 Dodis Y, Ostrovsky R, Reyzin L, et al. Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy
data. SIAM J Comput, 2008 38: 97–139
9 Dziembowski S, Pietrzak K, Wichs D. Non-malleable codes. In: Innovations in Computer Science, ICS 2010. Beijing:
Tsinghua University Press, 2010, 434–452
10 Gordon S D, Ishai Y, Moran T, et al. On complete primitives for fairness. In: Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2010,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5978. Berlin: Springer, 2010, 91–108
11 Guruswami V, Smith A. Codes for computationally simple channels: Explicit constructions with optimal rate. In: 51st
Annal IEEE Symposium. Philadelphia: IEEE, 2010, 723–732
12 Hirschfeld J W P, Storme L. The packing problem in statistics, coding theory, and finite projective spaces: update
2001. In: Finite Geometries. Proceedings of the Fourth Isle of Thorns Conference, Developments in Mathematics 3.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 201–246
13 Karpovsky M, Taubin A. New class of nonlinear systematic error detecting codes. IEEE Trans Inform Theory, 2004,
50: 1818–1820
14 Karpovsky M, Wang Z. Algebraic manipulation detection codes and their applications for design of secure communi-
cation or computation channels. Http://mark.bu.edu/papers/226.pdf
15 Obana S, Araki T. Almost optimum secret sharing schemes secure against cheating for arbitrary secret distribution.
In: Advances in Cryptology, Asiacrypt 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4284. Berlin: Springer, 2006,
364–379
16 Ogata W, Kurosawa K. Optimum secret sharing scheme secure against cheating. In: Advances in Cryptology, Euro-
crypt’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1070. Berlin: Springer, 1996, 200–211
17 Ogata W, Kurosawa K, Stinson D R, et al. New combinatorial designs and their applications to authentication codes
and secret sharing schemes. Discrete Math, 2004, 279: 383–405
18 Padro´ C, Sa´ez G, Villar J L. Detection of cheaters in vector space secret sharing schemes. Des Codes Cryptogr, 1999,
16: 75–85
19 Simmons G J. Authentication theory/Coding theory. In: Advances in Cryptology, Crypto’84, Lecture Notes in Com-
1358 Cramer R et al. Sci China Math July 2013 Vol. 56 No. 7
puter Science, vol. 196. Berlin: Springer, 1985, 411–431
20 Stinson D R. Some constructions and bounds for authentication codes. J Cryptology, 1988, 1: 37–51
21 Stinson D R. The combinatorics of authentication and secrecy codes. J Cryptology, 1990, 2: 23–49
22 Tompa M, Woll H. How to share a secret with cheaters. J Cryptology, 1988, 1: 133–138
23 Wang Z, Karpovsky M. Algebraic manipulation detection codes and their applications for design of secure cryptographic
devices. In: IEEE 17th International On-Line Testing Symposium. Philadelphia: IEEE, 2011, 234–239
24 Wee H. Public key encryption against related key attacks. In: Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2012, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 7293. Berlin: Springer, 2012, 262–279
